For how long can America remain the world’s “indispensable nation”? To find a formula that might extend the life of American predominance, would-be architects of US foreign policy have reignited debate over the proper balance of hard power and soft power. These terms, popularized by Joseph Nye (see “Shaping the future”, in this section), signify the coercive potential of US military and economic might and the persuasive potential of American ideas, values, and culture to “entice and attract.” These debates always end in agreement that a successful American foreign policy depends on both. But with the Bush administration on its way out, soft-power advocates are forcefully making the case that restoring America’s image abroad is essential to rejuvenating Washington’s global leadership. They also maintain the country’s hard-power advantages are less relevant.

These are assumptions worth questioning. Soft power does matter. It played an underappreciated role in swinging the Cold War in America’s favor, and it will continue to extend US influence abroad. But soft power alone cannot guarantee America remains indispensable for the world’s political and economic stability.

The erosion of US soft power has already begun. The American ideal of capitalism unbound, free trade, and private-sector innovation as the engine of global growth is being challenged by the rise of state capitalism, as practiced with greatest recent success in China and the Persian Gulf. The icons of American popular culture now share stage and screen with celebrities from dozens of other countries. American brands share shelf space as never before with foreign products.

America’s hard-power advantages are more durable. The United States spends more on its military capacity than every other nation combined. For all the paranoia in Washington about China’s growing military, the United States outspends China by nearly ten to one. Even if Washington scales back, it will be decades before other states can afford to try altering the balance of global military power—assuming any want to accept the burdens. Some emerging powers are gaining influence within their regional spheres, but none has the wherewithal to challenge America outside of them.

US military strength will remain useful—and not just for Americans. Economically vital commodities will require protection, for example. Governments around the world will become more serious about reducing their dependence on hydrocarbon-based energy. But the transition to a more diversified energy mix will take decades. In the meantime, more of the world’s fuel will come from potentially unstable regions—the Middle East, the Caspian Sea basin, and West Africa. With the world’s only global naval presence, the United States will be called on to ensure the free flow of oil and gas. Why should the Chinese invest in safeguarding the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important energy bottleneck, when America can do it for them?

The United States will be obliged to shoulder new military challenges as well. As Iran and other emerging states master the technology to enrich uranium, their nuclear clout may well provoke neighbors to turn to Washington to safeguard their security and help avoid an expensive arms race. Saudi Arabia once welcomed US troops as a bulwark against Saddam Hussein. Once Iran has a nuclear capability, which appears all but inevitable, America’s security umbrella will become more important than ever.

At the same time, Russia is driving Eastern European governments to seek the protection of NATO, which still depends on American leadership and muscle. Moscow has fed regional fears of Russian expansionism by bullying the Baltics, clashing with Georgia, and cutting off crucial natural-gas supplies to Europe for political reasons.

Over time, Japan will fall within China’s widening orbit. Like Taiwan, Tokyo could see that its long-term interests lie in economic integration with China. But if Chinese nationalism strains business ties, and if the two nations compete for scarce resources, Japan could instead follow Israel’s example. Tokyo could expand its military and rely more heavily on a US security alliance.

America’s soft power will remain a vital element of US foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Although recent US policies have cast it into disrepute, hard power can ensure America remains an indispensable nation for decades to come.

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