
The world stopped in 2008—and it was a full stop for the era of excess. Belatedly, the authorities have been extraordinarily aggressive in coming to the rescue of a system in crisis. But as in the case of Humpty Dumpty, they will not be able to put all the pieces back together again. The next era will be very different from the one we have just left behind.
The fundamental conceit of efficient-market theory—that markets can perfectly assess and thus price, slice, and dice risk—has collapsed like Edgar Allen Poe’s House of Usher.
Lying at the heart of the most common market theory—the efficient-market hypothesis—is the assumption that financial returns, including stock prices, are independent of one another. We now know without any doubt that this assumption is wrong.
The financial crisis of 2008—and the breathtaking rapidity with which it has spread—has brought home how truly interconnected world economies and markets have become. It has also underscored the need for the world’s economic policy makers to establish better ways of working together across borders.
As Wall Street has turned upside down, calls for more transparency, not surprisingly, have become increasingly intense. Markets thrive on information, the argument goes, and more information is better, right? Well, up to a point. When it comes to hedge funds and proprietary trading desks, transparency is not always a good thing. In fact, it can be dangerous.
One of the primary misconceptions about the 2007–08 financial crisis is that it resulted from, and has thus ended, a monotonic march of deregulation over the last three decades of the 20th century.
What is risk management all about anyway? We use the words as though everybody understands what we are talking about. But life is not that simple.
Some of my American and European friends were unsympathetic during the Asian financial crisis. A few even gloated over Asia’s misfortunes, displaying some of the West’s worst prejudices toward Asia. A decade later, fortunes have been reversed.
Many policy makers and business executives continue to assume that it’s just a matter of time until we go back to where we were before the crisis began. They are probably mistaken.
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McKinsey directors Lowell Bryan and Toos Daruvala present a plan that could solve the toxic-asset pricing problem voluntarily—without requiring Uncle Sam to nationalize the whole industry—and make (pretty much) everyone a winner. (The McKinsey Quarterly)
CFR Senior Fellow and Director of International Economics Benn Steil has provided an incisive explanation of the global financial crisis and its causes and a set of practical reforms to prevent its recurrence.
McKinsey's Lenny Mendonca discusses on Big Think, a global online forum, the challenges and opportunities emerging within a new global regulatory environment.